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Significance for public health  
Epidemiological data released by the Ministry of Health of Argentina was compared with the public 
health policies instituted by that country that have resulted among the longest, most restrictive, and 
more strictly enforced measures in the world intended to control COVID-19. Analysis of the data 
failed to detect a benefit of the public health measures instituted in Argentina when compared to a 
neighboring country with opposing policies. The findings reported here should be considered by 
Argentina as well as by other countries mandating or planning to implement long lasting stay-at-
home orders and lock-downs to control COVID-19 or during future pandemics to come. 
 
Abstract     
The variety and extent of non-pharmaceutical measures implemented by the government to control 
COVID-19 in Argentina were exceptional, making this country the best example to analyze the 
evolution of COVID-19 under the most stringent and longer-lasting restrictive policies- which up 
to May 31st 2021 included 119 days of strict nation-wide lock-down, 304 days of less restrictive 
lock-downs, and 35 days of curfews. Two of the three peaks of infection correlated with the 
germicidal solar flux received in Argentina, suggesting a seasonal component and a role for the 
virus persisting in the environment. A massive public gathering crowding the presidential square 
in Buenos Aires, during which nearly half of those present were without face masks, did not alter 






inhabitants) shows that COVID-19 in Uruguay, a neighboring country whose capital is at a similar 
latitude than Buenos Aires and who did not mandate lock-downs or curfews, progressed much 
slower (until vaccination started) than in Argentina. The number of yearly deaths caused by 
respiratory diseases and influenza in Argentina before the pandemic was similar to the total number 
of deaths attributed to COVID-19 cumulated on April 25, 2021, more than a year after the pandemic 
started. The failure to detect any benefit on ameliorating COVID-19 by the long and strict nation-
wide lock-downs in Argentina should raise world-wide concerns about mandating costly and 
ineffective restrictive measures during ongoing or future pandemics. 
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Introduction 
Computer modeling simulations, mainly from the Imperial College of London, predicted that 7 
billion infections and 40 million deaths would occur during 2020 alone if quarantine, lock-downs 
and other highly restrictive measures were not enforced.1,2 These measures published by leading 
scientific journals and disseminated widely by the press were considered instrumental3 in justifying 
1168 quarantine and lock-down policies mandated by the governments of 165 countries4 which 
resulted, by the first week of April 2020, in 3.9 billion people (more than half of the world's 
population) in quarantine or under in-house lock-downs.5  
Paralleling world-wide predictions1,2, a local simulation study also predicted much worse 
consequences of the pandemic in Argentina if lock down and other restrictions were not 
implemented, with infection rates sharply decreasing if the number of quarantined individuals 
increased.6 In contrast, an earlier study of the effect of traveling (to workplace, to the pharmacy, to 
buy groceries or to other places) on infection by SARS-Co V-2 reported that lock-down in 
Argentina could be effective in reducing mobility short term but should not be effective in reducing 
contagion long-term.7  
Argentina was among the countries instituting early (March 19, 2020) nation-wide and strictly 
enforced stay-home orders while its neighbor Uruguay chose not to mandate lock-down nor 






unique but the extent and variety of restrictions imposed on the population (as detailed below) were 
exceptional, making this country the best example to analyze the evolution of COVID-19 under 
the most stringent and longer-lasting restrictive policies taken by any country. The starting 
assumption of the present study was that any beneficial effect of lock-downs, quarantines and 
curfews should be amply evident in Argentina, if such effect exists.   
 
Design and methods  
The policies implemented in Argentina to control COVID-19 were those published periodically in 
the Argentinean Government Official Bulletin (Boletin Oficial del Gobierno).9 The present 
analysis comprised COVID-19 epidemiological data released daily by the Ministry of Health of 
Argentina from March 3rd 2020 to May 31st 2021.10 Total infections per million inhabitants, and 
deaths attributed to COVID-19 per million inhabitants, were calculated using a population figure 
of 45.5 million.11  
The compliance of mask wearing at the largest public gathering in Argentina during COVID-19 
was estimated from ninety-eight different photographs taken at the funeral of ex-soccer star Diego 
Maradona and posted in the internet by various sources. On these photographs we could score 
accurately 329 persons as either wearing face mask or not. Epidemiological data for Uruguay was 
obtained from the country's government daily updates.12 The epidemiological data corresponding 
to COVID-19 for Argentina and Uruguay were confirmed by the compilation made by the John's 
Hopkins' Center for System Sciences and Engineering.13 The germicidal solar flux received in 
Argentina (Buenos Aires) through the year and its virucidal effect on SARS-Co V-2 has been 
previously published elsewhere.14 Causes of death pre-pandemic were obtained from statistics 
released in 2018 by the government of Argentina.11   
 
Results 
COVID-19 policies in Argentina  
The first case of COVID-19 in Argentina was reported on March 3, 2020. The federal government 
responded to COVID-19 with a Resolution by Need and Urgency (Decreto de Necesidad y 






Gobierno) on March 19, 20209, when there were 97 cases and 3 death attributed to COVID-19.10,13 
This DNU declared obligatory nation-wide quarantine (Aislamiento Social Preventivo y 
Obligatorio or ASPO), whereby restricting the population of the whole country to their homes 
(known in Argentina as Phase I and indicated as region B in Figure 1) with the exceptions of 
essential personnel, like police. Curiously, personnel in public and private transportation (buses 
and taxis) were considered essential and allowed to circulate despite their main customers 
quarantined at home.  
Government agencies suspended in-person customer service. Social, cultural and sporting activities 
were cancelled and commerce closed all day. Exceptions to this policy included public and private 
clinics and hospitals, veterinary clinics, supermarkets and hardware stores serving to persons with 
documented addresses nearby (it is mandatory to carry identification documents at all times in 
Argentina). Persons considered at risk, including obese persons (with Grade II, body mass index 
35-39.9 kg/m2), were not allowed to return to work even to perform in the exempted occupations 
listed above (Resolution of Ministry of Labor # 207/2020). Essential workers must carry a written 
or digital permit while non-essential individuals may request a temporary circulation permit for 
going to the doctor, hospital or caring for a sick relative. This circulation permit (called CUIDAR) 
holds personal data and a QR code to control legitimacy. Persons detained without proper 
identification or circulation permit were fined or jailed (varying with the Province or 
circumstances) and their vehicles impounded. In addition, face masks, hand washing and social 
distancing of 1.5-2 meters (5-7 feet) were also required. 
The Argentinean Minister of Health declared on July 8, 2020 that “all bad colds are coronavirus 
until proven the contrary”15, and recommended not to laugh, sing or speak loudly to reduce 
contagion.16 In addition, The Ministry of Health of Argentina released on April 2020, 
"Recomendaciones para sexo seguro" (Recommendations for safe sex) stating that to prevent 
COVID-19 close contacts, including sex should be avoided.17                
The measures mandated in the 1st DNU (#297/2020) were prorogated every 15 days, remaining in 
force until July 18, 2020 when a new decree (DNU #605/2020) partially relaxed restrictions.18 
Under the measures mandated by DNU # 605/2020 (called by the government Distanciamiento 






Figure 1) industrial, commercial, or services activities were allowed as long as they had an 
operational permit approved by the provincial sanitary authority within the guidelines mandated 
by the national sanitary authority. Among other restrictions, the national sanitary authority limited 
operation of working activities to no more than 50% of the covered area of the installation. It was 
left to provincial sanitary authorities to rule particular days and hours for the performing of 
sporting, artistic or social activities as long as (by national guidelines) the number of participants 
remained below 10 individuals. In addition, the occupational density in close quarters (offices, 
restaurants, changing rooms, etc.) was limited to one worker per 2.25 square meters. These 
measures excluded personnel at risk, including obese individuals, from returning to work as 
decreed on March 19, 2020 (see above). Cinemas, theaters, cultural gatherings, and sports 
involving more than 10 persons or that could not preclude more than 2 meters separation between 
players remained prohibited. Tourism and the use of local and long-distance buses, except for 
personnel with proper authorization were impermissible. Social gatherings and family reunions 
remained prohibited regardless of numbers, except by people living in the same home. 
Restaurants were reopened (only by reservations, with 2 meter distance, and up to 4 people by 
table, see horizontal bars beneath the graph in Figure 1) on August 8, 2020, sometimes referred to 
as Phase III.  On October 16, 2020, transportation between cities was allowed by car or train, and 
obese persons were allowed to return to work (by Resolution # 47124/2020). On October 17, 2020 
the ban on urban and inter-urban public transport by school students and their tutors was lifted.  
On November 26, 2020 the National Government by General Decree #936/2020 authorized three 
days of national mourning for the death of Diego Maradona (an ex-soccer star, see Figure 1). This 
measure resulted in a massive gathering that government sources initially estimated to be one 
million but that disturbances could have reduced to little more than one-hundred thousand people 
each of two days, crowded nearby the Presidential palace in Buenos Aires.19  
On December 29, 2020 the vaccination campaign against COVID-19 began in Argentina20 (see 
label in Figure1).   
The Easter holiday, when over 2 million traveled in Argentina21, was a main reason to resume 
curfews on April 16, 2021 when restaurants were ordered to close at 23:00 hrs and the general 






Argentina as Toque de Queda) from midnight to 06:00 hours. Restaurants and industry curfews 
advanced to 19:00 hrs on May 1st, 2021.  On this date by DNU # 287/202122, Argentina moved 
back to Phase I (Zone D in Figure 1), imposing the highest level of restrictions as mandated during 
early 2020. These stringent restrictions were prorogued until May 30th, 2021 when the country 
transitioned to restrictions corresponding to Phase II with closure of general businesses and 
restaurants after 19 hrs and curfew to all but essential personnel between 20 and 06 hrs on weekdays 




Figure 1. Evolution of COVID-19 in Argentina. 
 
 
In the main panel COVID-19 infections reported daily by the government of Argentina were 






corresponding to the funeral of Diego Maradona, the start of the vaccination campaign, and massive 
traveling during the Easter holiday. Below the main graph the dates of starting and ending of stay-
at-home orders, curfews, schools, restaurants and international borders are indicated. The Inset 
depicts the number of daily infections per million inhabitants in Buenos Aires in relationship to the 
funeral of Maradona in that city.  
 
Progression of COVID-19 in Argentina 
The data reported daily by the Argentinean Ministry of Health10 and summarized in Figure 1 shows 
the progression (in daily infections per million inhabitants) of COVID-19 from the first case in 
March 2020 to May 21st, 2021.    
The data during the studied period shows that the evolution of COVID-19 in Argentina presented 
three main peaks separated by two intervening valleys with the following identifiable features after 
a basal pre-pandemic period (Zone A in Figure 1): 
 1) During the initial period of the pandemic (zone B in Figure 1) infections in Argentina remained 
low and relatively constant until mid May 2020.  
2) Infections increased rapidly with the incoming winter in spite of strict ongoing stay-at-home 
orders (enforced by police, Phase I) lasting until July 17, 2020.  
3) After the first peak observed in Figure 1 at the end of October, the number of infections falls 
rapidly with the start of summer in spite of aperture of international borders and consequent foreign 
traveling. The arrow in Figure 1 indicates the starting of the funeral of Diego Maradona which 
resulted in a massive gathering of people in Buenos Aires.23 We downloaded and analyzed as 
described in the Method section the available photographs (N=98) from the funeral and determined 
that 46.5% of the attending persons did not wear face masks (n= 329). Daily infections (per million 
in the INSET of Figure 1) in Buenos Aires according to local data24  remained relatively low (at 
or below the figures reported for the days immediately before the funeral, 40 cases/million per day) 
for 24 days after the funeral, until December 19, 2021, when infections begun increasing at a 
sustained rate. 
4) Unexpectedly, the apparent seasonal pattern of the pandemic is broken by a second peak of 






begun increasing after the Holidays (Christmas and New Year) which coincided with the start of 
the vaccination program20 (began in December 29, 2020, see arrow in Figure 1). 
5) The second peak of infections in Argentina decreases to a valley during March 2021. 
6) The major peak of COVID-19 in Argentina starts at the end of March 2021 (end of summer) and 
before extensive traveling during the Easter Holiday.21 
 
  
Figure 2. Comparison of COVID-19 in Uruguay and Argentina. 
  
Epidemiological data released by both governments was standardized per million inhabitants and 
show as a function of dates in red for Argentina and Blue for Uruguay. Main panel shows infections 
per million inhabitants with arrows pointing the initiation of the respective vaccination campaigns. 
The Inset depicts the progression of deaths attributed to COVID-19 in both countries. 
Figure 2 compares the progression of COVID-19 (infections per million inhabitants) in Argentina 
with neighboring Uruguay12,13, a country smaller and less populated than Argentina but of similar 






at the same latitude as Buenos Aires and hence with comparable germicidal solar flux throughout 
the year. 
 
Table 1. Key demographic parameters in Argentina and Uruguay 
 
      
In contrast to Argentina, Uruguay did not institute lock-downs and curfews nor closed schools or 
restaurants through the pandemic.8 The data in Figure 2 show that infections in Uruguay remained 
relatively constant and considerably lower than in Argentina from the first COVID-19 case to May 
3, 2021. The number of deaths per million inhabitants follows the shape of infections per million 
in both countries with higher numbers in Argentina than in Uruguay until mid-May 2021 (Figure 
2 INSET) at which time deaths per million inhabitants become similar in both countries. 
Unexpectedly, infections and deaths failed to decrease after initiation of the vaccination campaigns 
in both countries. 
According to data published by the Argentinean Ministry of Health in absence of pandemic (last 
report for year 2018 )11 more than 300,000 deaths occur yearly by identified causes. The leading 






pneumonia and influenza amounted to 61,668 in 2018 (Table 2), corresponding to 1,386 deaths per 
million inhabitants. After one year of pandemic since the first case (on March 3, 2020 ) the total 
number of deaths on March 3, 2021 were 52,453 (1179/million, Figure 2 Inset).  This number is 
smaller than the number of deaths caused by diseases of the respiratory system (including 
influenza) in Argentina during one year before the pandemic (see Table 2).   
The number of deaths attributed to COVID-19 (Figure 2 INSET) did not reach a number similar to 
the number of deaths caused by respiratory diseases (including influenza) before the pandemic in 
Argentina (61,668 deaths or 1,386 deaths per million) until April 25, 2021, more than one year 
after the first death attributed to SARS-Co V-2.   
 
Table 2. COVID-19 compared to other causes of death in Argentina  
Total deaths of 
defined causes 
 314852 First lock-down  
(3/19/20) 
 3 
Heart and Circulatory   95826 First Peak  
(10/22/20) 
27957 
Cancer, all types   63873 Vaccination Campaign starts                    
(12/26/20) 
42501
Respiratory Diseases   61668 2 months after vaccination 










Accidental deaths  19472 Reach number of deaths by 
respiratory causes in absence 
of pandemics (4/25/2021) 
61644 




















Causes of Deaths °, # Deaths attributed to COVID-19 °Last Statistics published by the Ministry 
of Health for the year 2018; #Maximum number of deaths attributed to SARS-Co V-2, which 
includes death by common germs on patients hospitalized with symptoms of COVID-19, death by 
severe adverse reaction resulting from inoculation with experimental vaccines, as well as potential 
over reporting as indicated by interviewed health care workers (personal communications). §GDP 







Although the restrictive measures mandated in Argentina failed to prevent infection by SARS-Co 
V-2 and progression of COVID-19 as demonstrated by at least three peaks of infections in Figure 
1, the policies resulted in the economical retraction of the GDP and GDP per capita shown in Table 




Early in the pandemic, during summer up to mid May 2020, the number of daily infections in 
Argentina remained relatively constant and low. The strictest confinement measures in force during 
this period (known in Argentina as Phase 1) did not prevent the increase in infections that started 
during mid May, 2020 and continued until the end of October 2020 (Phase II, zone C in Figure 1). 
The low infection rate observed up to mid May 2020 coincides with the relatively high germicidal 
solar flux received in Argentina during the end of summer and fall (UVB fluxes of 0.37 and 0.24 
Jm-2 min-1, respectively).14 These germicidal solar fluxes should inactivate 90% of SARS-Co V-2 
in Buenos Aires after 19 or 29 minutes of exposure, respectively.14   
The increase of infections in July-October 2020, as well as the peak beginning at the end of March 
2021 correlate with minimal or decreasing germicidal solar radiation received in Argentina (0.04 
Jm-2 min-1 during solar noon) when 90% of SARS-Co V-2 should persist infectious during 
relatively long time (several hours or days) in Buenos Aires.14    
After peaking in October 22, 2020, the sharp decrease in daily infections during November, 2020 
correlates with the solar transit to the Tropic of Capricorn with increasing solar flux in Argentina 
and relatively rapid inactivation of SARS-Co V-2 (90% in 19 minutes of noon sunlight in Buenos 
Aires) reaching a minimum of infections through the summer (December 2020 in Figure 1). 
The positive correlation between daily infections and germicidal solar flux in at last two of the 
infection peaks in Argentina indicates that inactivation of SARS-Co V-2 plays a role in the 
evolution of the pandemic. The present finding of seasonality of COVID-19 in Argentina agrees 
with previous studies suggesting a role of virus persisting in the environment during COVID-19 






solar radiation (requiring several minutes exposure).28 
However, one of the three peaks in infections initiated in summer 2021 when solar radiation was 
abundant (Figure 1). This particular unseasonable raise in infections not correlated with solar flux 
begun increasing at the end of December 2020 and peaked approximately on January 11, 2021. 
This summer peak could be explained by infections at family gatherings during the Holydays 
(Christmas and New Year). However, two large national gatherings in Argentina did not affect the 
infection curve. Infections remained low after more than 200,000 people gathered at the funeral of 
Maradona and traveling of over 2 million during Easter did not alter the increasing slope of the 
third peak presented in Figure 1. Thus, gathering of people during a previous large event and a later 
Holiday do not support increased infections during celebration of Christmas and New Year in 
Argentina. 
The increase of infections in summer reach its peak approximately 15 days after initiation of the 
vaccination campaign in Argentina (Figure 1).  Similarly, Uruguay, having had relatively fewer 
infections per million than Argentina, shows a steep increasing slope of infections at the start of 
vaccinations in that country (Figure 2). We present no conclusive data nor are implying a cause-
effect relationship between infections and vaccination. Any potential correlation between 
vaccination and infection in Argentina, as well as in Uruguay, is well beyond the scope of the 
present analysis but the observation deserves further study and elucidation.    
Travel and Social Distancing:  The funeral of Diego Maradona (an ex-soccer star worshiped in 
Argentina) appears to have been the largest gathering of people during COVID-19 anywhere in the 
world, which allows one to draw unique conclusions. Daily infections remained relatively low in 
Buenos Aires during 24 days after the funeral (Figure 1 INSET). Considering that 97.5% of the 
symptoms caused by SARS-Co V2 develop within 8.2 to 15.6 days of infection29; the 24 day period 
following Maradona’s funeral provided ample time for COVID-19 to flare up if significant 
contagion would have proliferated amongst the crowded mourners. That a gathering of 
approximately 200,000 people, approximately half of which did not wear face masks (see Results) 
and all crowded within a relatively small area (within the square across the government palace and 
few surrounding streets), failed to fuel COVID-19 infections (at the end of December 2020, in 






effect of social distancing (and mask wearing) during the pandemic.   
To the mobility of over two-million travelers in Argentina during the Easter holiday (1-7 April 
2021)21, the national government responded with strict curfews.22 These curfews however, failed 
to alter the peak of infection that started approximately on March 25, 2021. Thus, epidemiological 
data (released by the government) presented in Figure 1 indicates that domestic traveling had no 
detectable effect on COVID-19 in Argentina. 
Closing international borders did not prevent the infection peak occurring in October 2020 (in Zone 
C of Figure 1) and opening borders in November 2020 was followed by a decrease in infections. 
Similarly, closing and opening schools or restaurants (at the dates indicated at the bottom of Figure 
1) showed no effect on infections.   
 
Lack of Effect of Restrictions 
Infections in Argentina increased in spite of strict confinement during Phase I (zone B in Figure 1) 
and peaks of infection still occurred during partial restrictions in Phase II (zone C in Figure 1). 
Infections nearly doubled after instituting curfew on May 1st, 2021 that by police’s strict 
enforcement prevented total displacement of the general population (except essential personnel 
with official written authorization).22 The increase in infections during strict lock-down and 
curfews agrees with a previous study suggesting that forcing people to remain indoors, at home or 
in nursing homes, should increase (or assure) contagion among same household dwellers and 
among patients and personnel inside the same hospital or geriatric facilities.14  
To justify the high cost of lock-downs, any positive effect should have clearly surfaced in the 
present study above any potential effect of co-founding variables (curfew compliance, mask 
wearing, obesity, urbanization, demographics, etc.). Any limitations assigned to the accuracy of 
the data reported here should equally affect Argentina and Uruguay (with and without lock-downs, 
respectively), as well as many other countries of the world28, thus having little bearing on the 
conclusions being presented.  
The number of deaths attributed to COVID-19 in Argentina could include the basal number of 
deaths (in absence of epidemics) caused by common and recurrent respiratory diseases. In addition, 






infections by common germs contracted by patients hospitalized with COVID-19, and ii) to adverse 
reactions to vaccination. Therefore, deaths attributed to COVID-19 in Argentina could be over-
reported.  Regardless of the extent of over-reporting, deaths attributed to COVID-19 equaled pre-
pandemic deaths by respiratory disease (including influenza) only after more than one year of 
pandemic. In spite of a mortality attributed to COVID-19, similar to yearly deaths by respiratory 
causes pre-pandemics, Argentinean society had to endure during the crisis 119 days of strict lock-
down (phase I), 304 days of less restrictive lock-downs (Phase II), and 35 days of curfews (see the 
Policies section above).  
The progression of COVID-19 in Uruguay compared to Argentina in Figure 2 further demonstrates 
that lock-downs and curfews have no measurable benefit and instead, lock-downs could have 
accelerated the progression of COVID-19. In contrast, lock-downs and curfews seem to have a 
considerable impact on the economy (see Table 2), with Argentina showing during 2020 a 
reduction in per capita GDP twice as high as that of Uruguay (were lock-downs were not 
mandated). 
The fact that evolution of the pandemic in two neighboring countries with similar demographics 
and opposite policies (Uruguay and Argentina) failed to detect any obvious benefit in COVID-19 
infection or mortality of long and strict nation-wide lock-downs, closures and curfews, as instituted 
in Argentina, should be convincing evidence, or at least rise concerns, about insisting during 2021 
in mandating these costly restrictive measures. Considering the devastating effect on society and 
the economy, the burden of proof should fall heavily on proving a benefit of lock-downs and not 
on demonstrating their irrelevance.  
The lack of a beneficial effect of lock-down on the progression of COVID-19 in Argentina expands 
and confirms the previous findings by Larrosa7 and refute predictions by computer simulations of 
world-wide scope 1,2 as well as a local report (also based on computer simulation) that the pandemic 
would be controlled by lock-down, curfews and increasing restrictions.6 Lock-downs and other 
restrictive measures remained in place in Argentina and many other countries throughout the year 
2020 and first quarter of 2021, in spite of reports indicating as early as May-August 2020 that i) 
preventing healthy individuals from remaining outdoors had not resulted in significant differences 






outdoors14,28; ii) infection rates and mortality rates fell among countries with and without lock-
downs without a significant pattern3; and iii) full lock-downs were not associated with statistical 
significant reductions in the number of critical cases or overall mortality.30 Any benefits of lock-
downs were questioned in Germany31, not apparent in the Rep. of South Africa32, and ruled out as 
responsible in any decrease of the effective epidemic reproductive rate in the UK, suggesting these 
authors that key predictions by computer simulation should be considered artifacts.33   
Although the measures imposed in Argentina may have been extreme, the findings of the present 
study should apply to several other countries that implemented similar policies (albeit at a lesser 
degree). The findings reported here, in agreement with those noted above3,14,28, 30-33 , demonstrate 
that virtual computer simulation could complement but never replace real epidemiological data in 
policy making. These findings suggest that governments should refrain from reacting to unproven 
and apocalyptic predictions. Instead, carefully selecting to manage the pandemic of scientific 
leaders with specific and documented experience (by peer-reviewed publications in pertinent 
disciplines like field epidemiology, virology of rapid and lethal viruses, infection control, and/or 
immunology) seems as the best (and perhaps only) defense for avoiding the unproved measures 
that resulted so costly to the society and economy of Argentina as well as to those other countries 
adopting similar policies.  
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